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THE FUTURE OF SECURITIES LAW IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson* 
Since the enactment of the first federal securities statute in 
1933, securities law has illustrated key shifts in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence. During the New Deal, the Court’s secu-
rities law decisions shifted almost overnight from open hostil-
ity toward the newly-expanded administrative state to broad 
deference to agency expertise. In the 1940s, securities cases 
helped build the legal foundation for a broadly enabling ad-
ministrative law. The 1960s saw the Warren Court creating 
new implied rights of action in securities law illustrative of the 
Court’s approach to statutes generally. The stage seemed set for 
the rise of “federal corporate law.” The Court swiftly reversed 
itself, however, with Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. leading the 
effort to confine the reach of the securities laws. Powell suc-
ceeded in imposing a strict constructionism in securities law 
that never quite took hold in criminal or constitutional law. 
When there was a significant shift for the Court, securities law 
was prominent—at least until Powell’s retirement. Since then, 
the Court has meandered in its approach to securities law, its 
decisions neither expansive nor restrictive. The Court’s docket 
in this space has become a random walk of indifference. 
What is the future of securities law in the Supreme Court? 
We doubt that securities law’s bellwether status during its 
early days is likely to recur. The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, a groundbreaking agency of the 1930s, now seems like 
a small cog in a much larger administrative machine. Without 
prompting from the SEC, it is quite possible that the Court will 
continue to meander in the field of securities law. The Court—
which Franklin Delano Roosevelt populated with appointees 
 
* Frances and George Skestos Professor of Law, University of Michigan 
and Peter P. Weidenbruch Jr. Professor of Business Law, Georgetown Uni-
versity, respectively. Pritchard acknowledges the generous financial sup-
port of the William W. Cook Endowment of the University of Michigan. 
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having front-line experience writing the securities statutes, 
running the SEC, or defending the constitutionality of the se-
curities laws—has not had a member with any direct experi-
ence with securities law for more than thirty years. 
If the Court’s spotlight were to shine again on securities, we 
suggest it might well be a Chevron question of the SEC’s au-
thority. Proponents of corporate social responsibility could 
push the boundaries of the securities laws beyond the SEC’s 
historical focus on disclosure. Such a move could also be met 
by a federalism challenge to securities law preempting the field 
of state corporate law. These possibilities might once again put 
securities law at the center of the Court’s work to develop the 
law of the administrative state. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The future path of securities law in the U.S. will be influ-
enced by a variety of factors and actors:  statues passed by 
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Congress, regulations promulgated by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) and its enforcement of those stat-
utes and regulations, SEC interpretive guidance and occa-
sional special studies; innovations in the markets, 
international influences, and developments among the private 
parties who buy and sell securities. These disparate influ-
ences may generate descriptions of securities law that seem 
hard to reconcile at times, as in the traditional fable of the 
three blind men who provide widely different descriptions of 
touching the same thing because they, individually, are sepa-
rately interacting with the trunk, body, and tail of an ele-
phant. In this Article, we provide a perspective on the future 
of securities law that embraces one part of that elephant: the 
role of the Supreme Court. 
Our comparative advantage on this topic derives from our 
study of the role of the Supreme Court in securities law up 
until now. In a forthcoming book—The History of Securities 
Law in the Supreme Court—we chronicle the Court’s work in 
securities law.1 This history documents several distinct ap-
proaches by the Court since the inception of the federal secu-
rities laws in 1933. Each new approach was a sharp departure 
from its predecessor. 
In the 1930s, the tumultuous challenges of the Great De-
pression were met by a dramatic expansion of the federal gov-
ernment. Nowhere was the expansion more visible than in se-
curities law. The radical changes in the scope of federal 
regulation of the securities markets triggered an epic conflict 
between the administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and 
the Supreme Court. That conflict would eventually be re-
solved by Roosevelt’s appointment of a cadre of progressive 
 
1 That book builds on a series of articles by this Article’s authors, in-
cluding: A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law in the Six-
ties: The Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and the Triumph of Purpose 
Over Text, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371 (2018) [hereinafter Pritchard & 
Thompson, Securities Law in the Sixties]; A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. 
Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 841 
(2009) [hereinafter Pritchard & Thompson, New Deal Justices]; and A.C. 
Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the 
Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841 (2003) [hereinafter Pritchard, 
Powell and the Counter-Revolution]. 
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Justices to the Court, many of them warriors in the legislative 
and judicial battle to assert “social control of finance.” Their 
appointments led to a seismic change in the Court’s approach 
to federal legislation. The Court’s prior hostility toward eco-
nomic regulation that interfered with freedom of contract—
the hallmark of the “classical” tradition—dissolved, seemingly 
overnight. The new attitude reflected deference to the fledg-
ling SEC. 
After a period of relative neglect in the 1950s, the securi-
ties cases of the 1960s unleashed a dramatic change in the 
Court’s role, if not its direction. Moving beyond mere defer-
ence to the SEC’s expertise, the Court took the lead in shifting 
insider trading from a clunky statutory regime to one built on 
judicially defined rules. The Court also implied private causes 
of action for fraud under federal securities law. Those new-
found causes of action paved the way for securities fraud class 
actions to overshadow the public enforcement regime passed 
by Congress in the 1930s. 
The Court’s newfound activism would be short lived, and 
not repeated. For most of the 1970s and 80s, the Court’s secu-
rities decisions were as restrictive as the earlier periods had 
been expansive, with the SEC repeatedly rebuffed. That coun-
terrevolution reflected the impact of one Justice in particular: 
Lewis Powell. 
After Powell’s retirement in 1987, the Court’s path in se-
curities law took yet another direction or, perhaps more accu-
rately, became directionless. The Court’s decisions were nei-
ther consistently expansive nor restrictive. The pattern might 
be described as equipoise or, less charitably, indifference. 
These distinct shifts illustrate four approaches by the 
Court in dealing with securities law. Such patterns, in turn, 
can help frame predictions for the future. Will history repeat 
itself? We acknowledge, and indeed have emphasized in our 
prior work, the specific features of each period that shaped the 
Court’s jurisprudence during those eras. Those features may 
well not be replicated going forward. Add the impact of con-
stant evolution in the markets, and the predictive enterprise 
becomes still more fraught. Past results are no guarantee of 
future performance. 
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At the same time, as our elephant metaphor suggests, the 
Supreme Court’s docket is a small slice of the universe of se-
curities law. The Court’s cases have skewed toward certain 
topics, although the topics have varied with each era. For ex-
ample, the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA),2 
the New Deal statute that dominated the Court’s securities 
docket in the 1930s and 40s, quickly lost pertinence. Rule 10b-
5,3  promulgated by the SEC in 1942 but not addressed by the 
Court until 1969,4 has repeatedly captured the Court’s atten-
tion in the time since. Other broad areas, no less important in 
the practice of securities law, have drawn little attention from 
the Court. For example, issues under the Securities Act,5 such 
as registration, exemptions, and resales, have been the sub-
ject of few Court decisions. The Court’s lack of attention to 
these areas, notwithstanding their enormous economic signif-
icance, is likely inevitable, reflecting the vagaries of litigation 
and the certiorari process. Nonetheless, that process results 
in the Court addressing only a narrow sub-sample of securi-
ties law issues. The Court’s limited focus is likely to persist. 
With these caveats in mind, we look to the history of secu-
rities law in the Supreme Court to offer some predictions 
about its future. Part II describes the prior eras and the dis-
tinctive judicial approaches visible in the Supreme Court’s se-
curities cases. Part III evaluates the predictive power of the 
previous four dominant Supreme Court approaches in 
 
2 Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49 
Stat. 803 (1935), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 
119 Stat. 594. 
3 Prohibition of Fraud by Any Person in Connection with the Purchase 
or Sale of Securities, 7 Fed. Reg. 3,804 (May 22, 1942) (codified as amended 
at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020)). 
4 SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). More than a decade prior, 
in Black v. Amen, the Court was prepared to remand to the lower court to 
consider if Rule 10b-5 carries with it a private cause of action, see Letter of 
Felix Frankfurter, Just., U.S. Sup. Ct., to Earl Warren, Chief Just., U.S. 
Sup. Ct. (Nov. 20, 1957) (on file with the Felix Frankfurter Collection pt. 3, 
reel 4, Harvard Law School), but the case settled before the Court’s order 
was issued. 355 U.S. 600 (1958). 
5 Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77mm (2019)). 
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explaining the current environment for securities law at the 
high court. We also speculate about some issues that may be-
come prominent in the Court’s docket down the road. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S EVOLUTION IN 
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 1933–2021 
The federal securities laws and their administrator, the 
SEC, were born at a time when the constitutional framework 
of American government was being fundamentally rethought. 
The widespread economic distress of the Great Depression 
brought calls for reform, captured by the phrase “social control 
of finance.”6 As part of that process, the Supreme Court was 
challenged to reconsider its role in enforcing constitutional 
limits on the federal government. In less than a decade, the 
Court abandoned its “classical” approach, reflecting hostility 
toward regulation that interfered with “freedom of contract” 
or businesses that had only an “indirect” effect on interstate 
commerce. The Court essentially abandoned the limits it had 
enforced, more or less rigorously, over the prior half century. 
The Court’s new trajectory—directed by a wave of Roosevelt 
appointees—enthusiastically embraced the New Deal agenda 
of social control of finance. This radical transformation was 
the first of four very visible shifts in how the Court has ap-
proached securities law. 
A. From Restrictive Oversight of Regulation to Broad 
Support of Agency Expertise 
The Supreme Court’s first federal securities law decision, 
Jones v. SEC in 1936, was a shocking rebuke to the Roosevelt 
administration, then beginning its fourth year.7 The Court 
overturned an administrative action brought by the still nas-
cent SEC. The question before the Court was a narrow one of 
a registrant’s right to withdraw a registration statement. The 
agency had sought to rein in the behavior of a promoter of oil 
 
6 See Pritchard & Thompson, New Deal Justices, supra note 1, at 846–
72. 
7 Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936). 
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and gas securities, and the promoter had sought to evade the 
agency’s regulatory reach by abandoning his offering. The 
Court’s language was caustic, impugning the dogged efforts of 
the SEC as threatening civil liberties. Justice George Suther-
land, the intellectual leader of the “classical” tradition on the 
Court, wrote for the majority, going so far as to compare the 
fledgling agency’s procedures with the infamous Star Cham-
ber of sixteenth-century England.8 Despite the narrow ques-
tion decided (the agency had no authority over Jones after he 
withdrew his offering), the Court’s rhetoric did not bode well 
for the judicial prospects of the other securities statutes that 
had been enacted by Congress during Franklin Roosevelt’s 
first term, which were making their way  up the judicial lad-
der toward the Supreme Court. 
Sutherland’s rhetoric in Jones was shrill, but his approach 
proved to be the last gasp of the ancien régime that had pre-
vailed for decades. The following term, the Court embraced a 
more accommodating approach to the regulatory statutes of 
the New Deal.9 By the end of that term, Willis Van Devanter, 
one of the “Four Horsemen” resisting the constitutional revo-
lution, had retired.10 His retirement, encouraged by Congress 
providing more generous retirement pay for the Justices,11 
was quickly followed by others. Those departures opened the 
 
8 Id. at 28. 
9 The change is usually marked by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (upholding Washington’s state minimum wage act). See 
also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937) (upholding 
the National Labor Relations Act); Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937) (upholding Social Security tax). 
10 Letter from Willis Van Devanter, Just., U.S. Sup. Ct., to Franklin 





11 See Judge Glock, Unpacking the Supreme Court: Judicial Retirement 
and the Road to the 1937 Court Battle, 106 J. AM HIST. 47, 49 n.6 (2019). 
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door for Roosevelt to appoint eight Justices in just over five-
and-a-half years.12 
Roosevelt’s appointees came to the Court with back-
grounds that substantially differed from their predecessors’. 
Almost all his picks had gained front-line experience across 
the legislative, executive or judicial processes in (1) the battle 
to enact the securities and other regulatory statutes of the 
New Deal, (2) shaping the initial policies of the agencies that 
oversaw an increased regulatory oversight of the economy, or 
(3) defending the new laws against a hostile judiciary during 
Roosevelt’s first term. Felix Frankfurter, for example, while 
serving as a Harvard law professor was a key advisor to the 
Roosevelt administration in its efforts to draft the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,13 which 
empowered the SEC to oversee the stock exchanges and im-
pose disclosure requirements on public corporations. He also 
lobbied for PUHCA in 1935, playing a critical role in mid-
wifing its notorious “death sentence” provision intended to 
dismantle the public utility conglomerates of the day.14 Hugo 
Black, Roosevelt’s first appointee to the Court, also played a 
key role in enacting PUHCA, leading the battle in the Senate 
against public utility lobbying.15 Stanley Reed had been Solic-
itor General, among other key legal posts in the Roosevelt ad-
ministration, and he argued the first regulatory cases that 
went to the Supreme Court.16 His successor as Solicitor Gen-
eral, Robert Jackson, had worked his way to that post in part 
by playing a key role defending the new securities laws in 
court.17 Jackson left his role as the government’s top advocate 
 
12 Those appointed were Hugo Black, Stanley Reed, William Douglas, 
Felix Frankfurter, Frank Murphy, Robert Jackson, James Byrnes, and 
Judge Wiley Rutledge. Roosevelt also appointed Associate Justice Harlan 
Fiske Stone as Chief Justice when Charles Evans Hughes retired in 1941. 
13 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Exchange Act), 73 Pub. 
L. No. 291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq 
(2019)). 
14 Pritchard & Thompson, New Deal Justices, supra note 1, at 862–68. 
15 See id. at 867. 
16 Id. at 879. 
17 See id. 
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to replace Frank Murphy as Attorney General when Roosevelt 
appointed Murphy to the Court. William O. Douglas, like 
Jackson a close confidant of Roosevelt’s,18 was the third chair 
of the SEC. In that role, he pushed the agency to displace the 
traditional power brokers of the New York Stock Exchange 
and began the process of dismantling the public utility con-
glomerates.19 
The new securities laws reflected a fundamental shift in 
the role of government and administrative agencies. Social 
control of finance called for a new kind of government relying 
on agency expertise. The securities laws, and the SEC in par-
ticular, were at the center of this political movement.20 Roose-
velt’s transformation of the Court laid the groundwork for the 
SEC to enjoy an almost unbroken winning streak in the Su-
preme Court for the first four decades after the agency’s crea-
tion in 1934. During that time, the Court consistently deferred 
to the SEC’s financial expertise. Moreover, the Court seldom 
departed from an expansive interpretation of the securities 
laws. 
B. A Purposivist Court Further Extends the Reach of 
the Securities Laws 
After a somewhat fallow period for securities law generally 
in the 1950s, the 1960s brought the second shift in the Su-
preme Court’s approach to securities. This decade is better 
known to lawyers and historians for the Warren Court’s ex-
pansion of constitutional rights in multiple areas. The securi-
ties decisions that expanded the reach of federal law were of a 
piece with the Court’s dominant jurisprudence of this era, if 
not as well known. The phrase “federal corporate law” was 
coined to capture the trend.21 
 
18 L.A. Powe, Jr., Evolution to Absolutism: Justice Douglas and the 
First Amendment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 405 (1974). 
19 Pritchard & Thompson, New Deal Justices, supra note 1, at 926. 
20 See id. at 872. 
21 See Arthur Fleischer, Jr., ‘‘Federal Corporation Law”: An Assess-
ment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1146 & n.2 (1965) (noting the rise of the similar 
phrase “federal law of corporations”). 
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During that decade, the Court not only continued the ex-
pansive approach to interpreting the securities statutes that 
it had begun in the 1930s22 but went beyond the text of those 
statutes to find new remedies for investors. This judicial leg-
islation to create remedies beyond those Congress had ex-
pressly written into the securities laws was done in the name 
of extending those laws’ purpose, namely investor protection. 
This aggressive judicial expansion was primarily evident in 
two areas of the law—insider trading and the extension of im-
plied private rights of action. The lower courts had relied on 
Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC in 1942, to tackle many 
fiduciary breaches that were traditionally the province of 
state corporate law. The Supreme Court validated those 
broadly remedial interpretations in the 1960s and early 
1970s, giving a green light to the lower courts to push still 
further in the name of investor protection.23 
Congress had addressed insider trading in 1934, but only 
via the clunky, mechanistic remedy in section 16(b) of the Ex-
change Act.24 That provision targeted manipulation by insid-
ers more than trading on informational advantages, leaving 
many abuses unaddressed. By the end of the 1960s, the SEC 
had persuaded the Second Circuit to deploy the antifraud pro-
visions of the Exchange Act to regulate insider trading,25 re-
lying on an earlier Supreme Court decision in that decade em-
bracing a broad reach for a similar provision of the Investment 
 
22 On the rise of this approach in that era, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century Statutory Inter-
pretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1731, 1737–40 (1993). 
23 See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (“While th[e] 
language [of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act] makes no specific reference 
to a private right of action, among its chief purposes is ‘the protection of 
investors,’ which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where 
necessary to achieve that result.”). 
24 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Exchange Act), 73 Pub. 
L. No. 291, § 16(b), 48 Stat. 881, 896 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
78p(b) (2019)). 
25 See generally SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 
1968) (en banc). 
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Advisers Act.26 This move to attack insider trading had 
seemed impossible in 1934 and for decades thereafter,27 but 
the Second Circuit was emboldened by the Supreme Court’s 
purposivist approach. 
Similarly, the lower courts, and eventually the Supreme 
Court,28 extended the reach of Rule 10b-5’s prohibition 
against fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a se-
curity to give shareholders new remedies. These implied 
rights of action for shareholders allowed them to pursue mis-
management claims against corporate directors, traditionally 
the province of fiduciary duty litigation under state corporate 
law.29 In Bankers Life, Justice William O. Douglas, writing for 
a unanimous Court, painted with a broad brush, linking tra-
ditional securities regulation and fiduciary breaches by man-
agers as all part of “a single seamless web” and therefore ac-
tionable under federal securities laws.30 “Federal corporate 
law,” developed by the judiciary under the ostensible author-
ity of the securities statutes, appeared poised to occupy the 
field. 
C. A Strict Constructionist Approach 
Until it didn’t. Securities law at the Supreme Court took a 
dramatic turn beginning in 1972. As with the two earlier 
shifts discussed above, the change reflected a broader trend 
afoot at the Court. Once again, securities cases were at the 
leading edge. Richard Nixon had run for the presidency in 
1968, calling for the Supreme Court to follow “strict 
 
26 See id. at 855 (citing SEC v. Cap. Gains Rsch. Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 
195 (1963)). 
27 See WILLIAM H. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND CORPO-
RATE DISCLOSURE 221-23 (1979) (discussing the traditional approach to 
fraud that did not extend to nondisclosure in trading in anonymous mar-
kets). 
28 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 
(1971). 
29 See generally Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Federal Regulation of Internal 
Corporate Affairs, 29 BUS. LAW. 179 (1974). 
30 Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 11–12 (attempting to distinguish, however, 
mere “internal corporate mismanagement”). 
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construction” in construing the Constitution.31 Nixon’s cam-
paign, and subsequent appointments, were directed more to-
ward criminal procedure, and produced some incremental 
change in that space.32 By contrast, the change was consider-
ably more pronounced in the field of securities law. 
Nixon had made two appointments to the Court in his first 
two years—Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Harry 
Blackmun—but neither altered the path of securities law set 
in the 1960s. Indeed, Burger and Blackmun joined the most 
expansive of the securities decisions, including Douglas’s 
Bankers Life “seamless web” decision, the apogee of the pur-
posivist approach.33 But the arrival of Lewis Powell and Wil-
liam Rehnquist on the same day in January 1972 marked a 
180 degree turn in the Court’s approach to securities law. The 
SEC’s winning streak at the Court ended; the Court’s next 
twenty-five securities decisions would be uniformly restric-
tive, with opinions emphasizing statutory text.34 It is difficult 
to imagine a sharper turnabout of a dominant trend on any 
topic regularly addressed by the Supreme Court. 
This sea change was driven by the influence of one Justice: 
Lewis Powell.35 Powell had practiced corporate and securities 
law for three decades prior to joining the Court.36 When he 
donned the black robe, Powell did not leave his interest in se-
curities law behind. More particularly, he viewed the Court’s 
free-wheeling approach of the 1960s as a disaster.37 Powell’s 
influence, backed by experience and expertise, not only 
 
31 See Keith E. Whittington, Taking what They Give Us: Explaining the 
Court’s Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 505 (2001). 
32 See id. 
33 The other notably broad decision is Blackmun’s opinion for the Court 
in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152–53 (1972) 
(adopting a presumption of reliance for fraudulent omissions). 
34 See E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court 
and Private Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1571, 1584 & fig.1, 1629 app. A (2004) (showing a nearly-unbro-
ken stretch of “restrictive” securities decisions in the period after 1972). 
35 See generally Pritchard, Powell and the Counter-Revolution, supra 
note 1. 
36 Id. at 847–48. 
37 See id. at 863–65. 
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pushed the Court toward more restrictive decisions, but also 
to take more securities cases. The result was a spike in the 
Court’s securities docket and a counterrevolution in the re-
sults. Powell would be in the majority in thirty-nine of the 
forty securities decisions in which he participated during his 
tenure and would write eleven of the opinions, far more than 
any other Justice.38 The implied private rights of action that 
the Court had announced over the previous decade were re-
stricted.39 Barriers were erected to the implication of any new 
implied claims.40 The deference that the SEC had tradition-
ally enjoyed at the Court gave way to a much more skeptical 
view from the majority.41 Powell’s dominance of securities law 
during his fifteen years on the Court illustrates how one Jus-
tice can influence the Court’s docket and direction. 
D. Equipoise or Indifference 
Powell’s influence can be seen not only in the Court’s hold-
ings during his time on the bench—he wrote more majority 
opinions for the Court in securities cases than any other Jus-
tice since the adoption of the securities laws42—but also in the 
change in the Court’s securities decisions once he retired. The 
restrictive view of the prior fifteen terms gave way to what 
 
38 See id. at 858 tbl.1 (tallying that Justice Powell was in the majority 
of forty of forty-one securities decisions during his tenure, of which he wrote 
twelve). We are now of the view that there were forty securities decisions 
during Justice Powell’s tenure, and that Justice Powell wrote eleven of those 
opinions. Id. at 858 tbl.1 categorized Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 
156 (1974) as a securities decision. However, that case actually concerns an 
antitrust claim involving securities brokers where the Court decided the 
correct interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 159. As such, 
while it is an important decision for securities law, it is not a securities de-
cision per se.  
39 See id. at 866–73. 
40 See id. at 885–91. 
41 Id. at 947. 
42 See id. at 858 tbl.1 (tallying cases during Justice Powell’s tenure); 
John C. Coates IV, Securities Litigation in the Roberts Court: An Early As-
sessment, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 8 tbl.2 (2015) (extending tally of securities law 
cases through 2014); Sullivan & Thompson, supra note 34, at 1629 app.A 
(collecting securities cases from 1936 onward). 
PRITCHARD & THOMPSON 8/22/2021  9:55 PM 
894 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2021 
has been essentially a fifty-fifty split between expansive and 
restrictive outcomes during the more than thirty years since 
Powell’s retirement.43 Moreover, the number of securities 
cases taken by the Court, which jumped dramatically when 
Powell arrived, dropped back to its pre-Powell level upon his 
retirement.44 In addition to that numerical decline, the issues 
resolved have seemed less important to the practice of securi-
ties law.45 In the absence of the frontline experience of the 
New Deal Justices, the purposivist resolve of the 1960s Court, 
or the dominance of Powell, securities law has lost its bell-
wether status in illustrating the larger movement of the 
Court. This most recent period thus offers a fourth pattern, 
with the Court’s decisions perpetually meandering. Securities 
law does not generate issues at the top of the country’s politi-
cal agenda, as it did in the 1930s, and the Court has not had 
a Justice with a particular interest in the topic since Powell 
retired.46 The resulting path of securities law in the Supreme 
Court now looks more like a random walk. 
III. WHAT THE PAST MAY TELL US ABOUT THE 
FUTURE 
What does the past tell us about the future of the Supreme 
Court in the field of securities law? We begin in Section III.A 
by examining the likelihood that any of the four patterns iden-
tified in Part II will recur. We then turn in Section III.B to 
consider issues that could alter the path of the Court’s deci-
sions in securities. 
 
 
43 See Coates, supra note 42, at 20. 
44 See id. at 7, 8 & tbl.2. 
45 For example, the Court now seems obsessed with statute of limita-
tions issues in securities law. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 
U.S. 633, 646–48 (2010) (interpreting statute of limitations for Rule 10b-5 
claims). 
46 See Coates, supra note 42, at 26 (“[N]o transactional lawyer—corpo-
rate or securities from a nonlitigation perspective—has served on the Su-
preme Court since Justice Powell.”). Coates’s observation remains true in 
2021. 
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A. The Likelihood of the Reappearance of the Drivers 
of the 1930s, 60s, or 70s 
The first shift described in Part II was principally a re-
sponse to the Great Depression, but it also reflected a rethink-
ing of the constitutional status of federalism. State securities 
law was deemed inadequate to the task of investor protection, 
and federal law was introduced to shore up that weakness. 
Historical limits on Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause were swept away.47 The role of federalism would 
reemerge in each of the shifts of the Sixties and Seventies, al-
beit in opposite directions. The aggressive purposivism of the 
Sixties was driven in part by dissatisfaction with the role of 
state courts in enforcing fiduciary standards.48 The Seventies 
represented a sharp repudiation of that trend and an affirma-
tion of the states’ role in corporate law.49 Looking to the im-
mediate future, however, we see little chance of another fun-
damental shift of authority between the state and federal 
governments in the fields of corporate and securities laws. 
The Court’s first dramatic shift in securities law was the 
product of the devastating economic dislocation of the Great 
Depression. Both elites and the public had lost faith in the 
status quo given the breadth and depth of the economic pain 
of the era; the laissez faire of the classical legal tradition 
seemed repudiated by events on the ground. Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’s Commonwealth Club speech during the 1932 pres-
idential campaign presaged dramatic developments ahead.50 
 
47 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish gets much of the attention. 300 U.S. 
379 (1937). United States v. Carolene Products Co. reflects the broader 
trend. 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938) (describing rational basis review). 
48 See e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 
6, 11–12 (1971) (federal securities claims part of “a single seamless web” 
with state fiduciary duty claims). 
49 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74, 478–79 
(1977). 
50 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Commonwealth Club Address (Sept. 23, 
1932), https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrcommonwealth.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8FME-QN6F] (“Our task now is not discovery or exploita-
tion of natural resources, or necessarily producing more goods. It is the so-
berer, less dramatic business of administering resources and plants already 
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Felix Frankfurter, who played a role in the drafting of the first 
three securities acts during Roosevelt’s first term,51 had al-
ready identified the need for a new approach to government 
in his Dodge Lectures at Yale in 1930. He set out the govern-
ment’s failings and the skills that expert administrative agen-
cies could bring in responding to economic crises.52 A similar 
fundamental change was visible—although slow to gain mo-
mentum—in the Supreme Court’s approach to constitutional 
law and statutory interpretation. Over a fairly short period in 
the later 1930s and early 1940s, the Court abandoned the clas-
sical approach that had dominated its early-twentieth century 
jurisprudence.53 The Court, rapidly transformed by Roose-
velt’s second-term appointments, embraced a much broader 
role for the federal government and expert agencies in ad-
dressing the country’s economic problems. 
The second and third shifts discussed in the previous Part 
saw a yo-yoing of authority between the state and federal gov-
ernments. The free-wheeling interpretive approach of the Six-
ties was propelled by a dominant liberal majority on the Court 
and dissatisfaction with the deficiencies of state law in ad-
dressing fiduciary breaches to tame corporate mismanage-
ment.54 Federal securities law—”federal corporation law”—
threatened to displace state corporate law in governing the 
 
in hand, of seeking to reestablish foreign markets for our surplus produc-
tion, of meeting the problem of under consumption, of adjusting production 
to consumption, of distributing wealth and products more equitably, of 
adapting existing economic organizations to the service of the people. The 
day of enlightened administration has come.”). 
51 Pritchard & Thompson, New Deal Justices, supra note 1, at 842 (de-
scribing how Frankfurter helped choose the drafters of the SEC’s founding 
statutes). 
52 FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 72–73 (1930). 
53 The Court had struck down more than twenty Congressional laws 
between 1920 and 1932. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROO-
SEVELT: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL 455 (1st ed. 1960). 
54 See Louis Loss, Remarks at the Conference on Codification of the 
Federal Securities Laws (1966), in 22 BUS. LAW. 917, 918 (1967) (“[W]hat 
we have from 10b-5 was overdue . . . . The common law was strangely lag-
gard in appreciating the fiduciary obligations of directors and other insiders 
to shareholders.”). 
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relationship between management and shareholders.55 The 
pushback of the 1970s and 1980s, in turn, was a response to 
the perceived overreaching of the judiciary in promoting fed-
eral corporate law on the basis of limited statutory author-
ity.56 A more conservative Court shifted course to preserve the 
traditional views of limited federal government and the role of 
the states in corporate governance.57 
We are skeptical that any of those shifts are likely to recur 
soon. The nation has experienced subsequent economic chal-
lenges, with the Great Recession that began in  2007/2008  
standing out as the most serious financial crisis since the 
1930s.58 The lead-up to Great Recession exhibited some of the 
same greed and unconstrained market excesses that had 
marked the 1920s.59 The problems were exacerbated by the 
failure of regulators—including the SEC—to anticipate the 
rising dangers.60 The bailouts of key financial players and 
 
55 Fleischer, supra note 21, at 1148 (“It is the thesis of this article that 
the growth of federal law in the corporate area is sound and consistent with 
the scope and purposes of the securities laws and that the critics’ attacks 
are misdirected.”). 
56 See Pritchard & Thompson, Securities Law in the Sixties, supra note 
1, at 430. 
57 See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74, 478–79 (1977). 
58 See, e.g., Chart Book: The Legacy of the Great Recession, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (June 6, 2019), https://www.cbpp.org/re-
search/economy/the-legacy-of-the-great-recession [https://perma.cc/45JR-
TWBK] (describing the Great Recession as the worst economic downturn in 
the United States since the Great Depression). 
59 See, e.g., Systemic Risk: Examining Regulators’ Ability To Respond 
to Threats to the Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 110th Cong. 12–13 (2007) (statement of Robert Kuttner, Editor, Am. 
Prospect) (“Although the particulars [of the Great Depression and the Great 
Recession] are different . . ., financial history suggests that the risks and 
abuses are enduring. They are variations on a few hearty perennials: Excess 
leverage, conflicts of interest, nontransparency, misrepresentation, and en-
gineered euphoria.”). 
60 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled 
Collapse, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2008), https://www.ny-
times.com/2008/09/27/business/27sec.html [https://perma.cc/Z75E-YAJ3] 
(describing an Inspector General’s report that concluded “that the S.E.C. 
division that oversees trading and markets had failed to update the rules of 
PRITCHARD & THOMPSON 8/22/2021  9:55 PM 
898 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2021 
enhanced financial reforms such as the Volcker Rule61 and the 
creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)62 
were the most dramatic regulatory changes in finance since 
the New Deal. But it was scarcely the regulatory tsunami of 
the 1930s. These new regulatory interventions were overlaid 
over the plethora of regulatory bodies that had grown up since 
1929. The Great Recession did not fuel a political movement 
to displace the SEC and other regulators, although Congress 
did lay on additional responsibilities.63 
In the 1930s, the SEC had been the fair-haired child of reg-
ulatory reform, perhaps because the agency was starting from 
a blank slate, unencumbered by pre-New Deal political com-
promises. Moreover, the new agency was not populated with 
carry-overs from prior administrations, but instead became a 
magnet for enthusiastic New Dealers, many of them new to 
Washington.64 It was no surprise, then, that the Roosevelt ad-
ministration assigned the SEC the central role when the gov-
ernment took on the daunting task of reorganizing the holding 
companies that controlled electrical power production and gas 
distribution across the country.65 Three years later, the 
 
the [voluntary supervision] program and was ‘not fulfilling its obliga-
tions.’”). 
61 See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1620–31 (2010) (codified as amended 
at 12 U.S.C. 1851 (2019)). 
62 See id. § 113 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323). 
63 The Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 did add one new regulatory agency, the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Id. § 1011 (codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 5491). But the CFPB was limited in its impact by the Trump ad-
ministration’s hostility including the pursuit of a Supreme Court challenge 
in which the Court declared the statute’s “for cause” limitation of the Pres-
ident’s removal power over the Bureau’s single director unconstitutional. 
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020). 
64 James Landis, a Harvard faculty member whom Felix Frankfurter 
brought to Washington to help draft the 1933 Act (along with two other 
Frankfurter protégés, Thomas Corcoran and Ben Cohen) became the second 
chair of the SEC. See Pritchard & Thompson, New Deal Justices, supra note 
1, at 850, 870. William O. Douglas from the Yale faculty joined the staff of 
the new SEC and became its third chair. See id. at 852, 870. 
65 See generally Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), Pub. L. 
No. 74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (entrusting administration of the statute to 
PRITCHARD & THOMPSON 8/22/2021  9:55 PM 
No. 2:881]      THE FUTURE OF SECURITIES LAW IN THE SUPREME COURT 899 
Chandler Act gave the SEC a critical role in business reorgan-
izations generally.66 In between, the agency, under the hard-
driving leadership of William O. Douglas, a future Supreme 
Court Justice, had seized the lead in regulating the stock mar-
kets. In his more ambitious moments, Douglas flirted not only 
with federal incorporation, but also with a government takeo-
ver of investment banking.67 The SEC was the New Deal’s “go 
to” agency for regulating business. 
By 2008, the SEC seemed a much smaller cog in a much 
larger federal regulatory system, with the Treasury, the Fed-
eral Reserve, and other agencies thought to be more signifi-
cant. Moreover, the agency had utterly failed in its role of 
overseeing the risk management practices of the investment 
banks that played an outsize role in the unraveling of the fi-
nancial markets.68 The implementation of the Volcker Rule, 
intended to limit that risk, was shared among five agencies.69 
The SEC is one of nine agencies whose chairs serve on the 
FSOC under the Secretary of the Treasury.70 The SEC in-
creasingly appears to be a small voice in a larger chorus. 
The financial crisis leading to the Great Recession demon-
strated that the country remains susceptible to existential 
 
the SEC), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 
Stat. 594. 
66 See Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, ch. 10, 52 Stat. 840, 883–905 
(1938), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 
2549 (1978). 
67 Letter from William O. Douglas, Professor, Yale L. Sch., to Felix 
Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard L. Sch. 2 (Feb. 19, 1934); Letter from Wil-
liam O. Douglas, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Henry A. Wal-
lace, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. 3–4 (Apr. 11, 1938) (on file with the William 
O. Douglas Collection, Library of Congress) (advocating a system of govern-
ment investment banking). 
68 See, e.g., Labaton, supra note 60. 
69 Volcker Rule, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/volcker-rule.htm 
[https://perma.cc/R5LF-FBP6] (last updated Jan. 30, 2020); Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 
619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–31 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 1851 
(2019)). 
70  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 
111(b)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 5321(b)(1)). 
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crises of the sort seen in 1929. But the threats that loom larg-
est today—climate change and pandemics, for example—are 
more environmental than financial. They seem removed from 
the core of securities law, although politicians will endeavor 
to squeeze them in, as with conflict minerals.71 It seems un-
likely that finance will prove the key battleground for working 
out larger issues of government anytime soon, as it did in the 
Thirties and Forties. The enactment of PUHCA in 1935,72 and 
the Chenery cases in the 1940s,73 were major steps forward in 
bold experiments in government. So, too, albeit in a different 
space, were the implied private rights of action cases decided 
by the Court in the 1960s.74 Those cases gave rise to the con-
cept of the “private attorney general,” revolutionary in its 
day.75 Today, the securities cases that do reach the Court do 
not seem important even for the securities field itself, much 
less for any other area of the law or government. 
The run of Democratic control of both the White House and 
Congress that paved the way for the federal securities laws in 
the Thirties has given way to frequently divided government 
and regular trading of control of the White House and the two 
chambers of Congress.76 That alternating hold on power has 
 
71 Requirement of Report Regarding Disclosure of Registrant’s Supply 
Chain Information Regarding Conflict Minerals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1 
(2020) (reporting requirements for registered companies that need conflict 
minerals for “the functionality or production of a product manufactured” by 
the company). 
72 Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), Pub. L. No. 74-333, 
49 Stat. 803 (1935), repealed by Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
58, 119 Stat. 594. 
73  SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943); SEC v. 
Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
74 See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1964) (recog-
nizing a private cause of action under Rule 14a-9 of the Securities Exchange 
Act). 
75 See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 61 & n.13 (1977) 
(Stevens, J. dissenting)) (describing and defending private attorney general 
enforcement of securities, antirust, and civil rights law). 
76 From 1933 until 1947, Democrats controlled the Presidency, the 
House, and the Senate. One political party has not had a unified govern-
ment for more than four years in a row since 1969. See Party Divisions of 
the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present, U.S. HOUSE OF 
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generated little legislation to drive the Court’s caseload in se-
curities, as PUHCA did in the Forties. Tender offer regulation, 
which generated a brief run of cases after Congress enacted 
the Williams Act in 1968, no longer gets any attention from 
the Court.77 Proxy regulation has infrequently returned to the 
Court since the lightning bolt of J. I. Case Co. v. Borak in 1964 
gave rise to implied rights of action.78 The spike in the Court’s 
securities docket during Powell’s time can mainly be at-
tributed to his influence;79 Congress did next to nothing in the 
field of securities law during Powell’s era to provoke a judicial 
response. The two biggest deregulatory acts in the history of 
federal securities law, the Private Securities Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995 (PSLRA)80 and the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012,81 both passed during times of 
divided government,82  have not generated Supreme Court 
cases that changed the direction of securities law, much less 
the law more generally. The key PSLRA issues were largely 
resolved by Congress, leaving the Court to resolve residual 
 
REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divi-
sions/Party-Divisions/ [https://perma.cc/4KWH-ZSGP] (last visited Mar. 3, 
2021); Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/party-
div.htm [https://perma.cc/39FL-QJCK] (last visited Mar. 3, 2021); Presi-
dents, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-
house/presidents/ [https://perma.cc/A3GT-S67A] (last visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
77  See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975). The 
most recent Supreme Court case interpreting the Williams Act was decided 
in 1997. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
78 Borak, 377 U.S. at 430–31. 
79 See supra Section II.D. 
80 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. 
No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.). 
81 See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 
112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
82 Republicans controlled one or both houses of Congress, while Demo-
crats were in the White House for both. See Party Divisions of the House of 
Representatives, 1789 to Present, supra note 76; Party Division, supra note 
76; Presidents, supra note 76. Congress adopted the PSLRA over President 
Bill Clinton’s veto. MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 98-147, 
PRESIDENT CLINTON’S VETOES 2 tbl.1 (2004). 
PRITCHARD & THOMPSON 8/22/2021  9:55 PM 
902 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2021 
ambiguity, a routine task of statutory interpretation.83 We 
have not seen a return to the wholesale judicial legislation of 
the 1960s, with the Court filling in gaps in securities laws af-
ter two decades of Congressional neglect. The issues raised by 
the JOBS Act—new regulatory exemptions for Reg A+ or pri-
vate offerings or resales,84 or broader ways to avoid public 
company status85—have yet to generate any litigation for the 
Court and seem unlikely to do so. The important issues will 
be resolved by the SEC with minimal judicial intervention. 
Another key factor that has historically pushed securities 
law to the fore of the work of the Supreme Court—the pres-
ence of Justices with experience or interest in the field—has 
also disappeared. We do not anticipate the return of a Justice 
with a deep personal knowledge of the regulatory context of 
securities law, a key feature of all three periods discussed 
above. There has been no Justice with knowledge or experi-
ence in the field of securities since Powell retired in 1987. If 
anything, that gulf is wider than even the long passage of time 
suggests. Except for Chief Justice John Roberts, the Justices 
have who have joined the Court since Powell left have had no 
sustained experience working as attorneys for private enti-
ties.86 Former academics and government lawyers now domi-
nate the Court. All but one Justice—Justice Elena Kagan, who 
had been Solicitor General after a career as an academic—
came to the Court from one of the federal appellate courts.87 
Roosevelt’s appointees, by contrast, had cut their teeth in 
drafting the securities statutes, litigating the constitutional 
 
83 See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court: Agenda 
or Indifference?, 37 J. CORP. L. 105, 108–09 (2011). 
84 See JOBS Act sec. 401, § 3(b) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2019)). 
85 See, e.g., JOBS Act § 501 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A)). 
86 See Coates, supra note 42, at 26. John Roberts served as an appellate 
lawyer at a law firm for nearly fifteen years. See Aaron M. Houck, John G. 
Roberts, Jr., BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-G-
Roberts-Jr (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review) (last updated 
Jan. 23, 2021). However, he spent about as much of his career practicing in 
the public sector as in the private sector, and his work as an appellate law-
yer at a Washington law firm traded on his government experience. See id. 
87 Current Members, SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/bi-
ographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/98KT-ZPJQ] (last visited Mar. 3, 2021). 
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status of those statutes, or running the SEC.88 Given the cur-
rent state of the nomination process, the likelihood that an-
other Justice Powell is nominated to renew the Supreme 
Court’s interest in securities law seems vanishingly small. 
Where does that leave the Court in the field of securities 
law? The obvious answer is the continuance of the current 
norm, which has persisted since Powell left the Court in 1987. 
The Court takes far fewer securities cases, and its opinions 
bounce back and forth between those that expand the reach of 
regulation and those that cut it back. Rarely does a Supreme 
Court opinion make much of a difference at all to the practice 
of securities law. Basic Inc v. Levinson is  the exception that 
proves the rule, and even that decision stands out for its fail-
ure to grapple with the enormous economic consequences it 
engendered.89 The Court, presented with an opportunity to 
rein in the class action juggernaut it had released, took a pass 
in Halliburton II, going out of its way to disclaim any judicial 
role in reforming securities class actions notwithstanding the 
judiciary’s role in creating that cottage industry.90 The Court 
instead left it to Congress to develop any reforms. Given that 
hands off approach, underscored by the meandering path that 
the Court has followed for thirty years—a third of the Su-
preme Court’s history with the federal securities law—we can-
not discount the likelihood that the Court will continue to 
wander in the field of securities law. 
B. New Sources of Securities Litigation before the 
Supreme Court 
The random walk is the most obvious prospect, but not all 
that interesting. The theme of this Symposium calls on us to 
speculate, so we will. What could change the Court’s direction 
 
88 See supra Section II.A. 
89 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246–47 (1987) (permitting class 
action plaintiffs in a private securities fraud action under Rule 10b-5 to in-
voke a rebuttable presumption of reliance, opening the way for broader set 
of 10b-5 claims against public companies). 
90 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund (Halliburton II), 573 U.S. 258, 
277 (2014) (“These concerns are more appropriately left to Congress[.]”). 
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in securities law? One possibility is the impact of rapidly ad-
vancing technology and international competition on securi-
ties markets. It also seems possible that administrative law 
will return to the fore, this time driven by Chevron concerns. 
The latter possibility may be prompted by new federal regula-
tory interventions to expand federal rules for public corpora-
tions. 
1. Technology Advances and Market Innovations 
Technology has disrupted securities markets in the 
twenty-first century more than either politics or any financial 
crisis. Consider, for example, the strict regulatory approach of 
the Securities Act with regards to new issues of securities.91 
The Securities Act provoked controversy almost immediately 
upon its enactment.92 The intrusive regulatory approach of 
the initial act, with its draconian liability standards, survived 
an immediate effort to water it down during the first year af-
ter its passage.93 In the decades that followed, the Act main-
tained a strongly pro-regulatory approach. Wall Street made 
an uneasy peace with the regime developed by the SEC, per-
haps because the industry profited from its anti-competitive 
aspects.94 Nonetheless, the Act’s rigorous disclosure require-
ments and liability provisions have pushed market intermedi-
aries to develop technologically-driven alternatives. As a re-
sult,  the economic footprint of the Act has been limited. 
 
91 See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2019). 
92  See Pritchard & Thompson, New Deal Justices, supra note 1, at 856–
57. 
93 See id. 
94 Cf. Letter from Thomas Corcoran to Felix Frankfurter, Professor, 
Harvard L. Sch. 1 (May 11, 1934), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/pa-
pers/1930/1934_05_11_Corcoran_to_Frank.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AV6-
EYVN] (“If Ray [Moley] is any barometer of what’s going on in the White 
House mind, the plan of battle is to avoid any further attempt at reforms 
that might bring down more criticism during the present Congress, arrange 
a ‘truce of God’, reorganize the machinery down here to help along business 
recovery this summer, and in every other way postpone all other considera-
tions to the necessarily primary objective of winning the Congressional elec-
tions.”). 
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Direct listing has now transformed from a seldom used 
means of accessing public trading markets into an attractive 
option.95 Companies following that route can raise new capital 
without jumping through the traditional hoops of extensive 
disclosure, SEC staff review, and market intermediaries 
whose potential liability has provided a restraining influence 
on issuer overreach.96 
Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), have 
gained an even larger presence as an alternative way to go 
public, essentially splitting the IPO process in two and by-
passing some of the traditional scrutiny IPOs receive.97 Public 
investors are invited to buy shares in an empty shell company 
(i.e., a non-operating company) backed by a sponsor, often a 
celebrity.98 Only after the SPAC has gone public does the 
sponsor focus on a suitable, privately-held acquisition candi-
date; a merger leaves the operating company as the surviving 
entity—now with publicly traded shares. The key difference is 
that the price of the operating company is not set, as in a tra-
ditional IPO by an investment banker’s “book building” to see 
what price public investors are willing to pay for the shares, 
but rather by the sponsor negotiating the price with the pri-
vate company’s managers.99 This alternative process has 
 
95 The SEC approved new and broadened NYSE rules for direct listing 
in December 2020 as consistent with the Exchange Act. See Order Setting 
Aside Action by Delegated Authority and Approving a Proposed Rule 
Change, as Modified by Amendment No. 2, To Amend Chapter One of the 
Listed Company Manual To Modify the Provisions Relating to Direct List-
ings, 85 Fed. Reg. 85,807, 85,807–10 (Dec. 29, 2020). 
96 See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in 
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 
338–39 (2013) (discussing attempts to avoid these obligations). 
97 Amrith Ramkumar & Maureen Farrell, When SPACs Attack! A New 
Force Is Invading Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2021, 12:00 AM) (on file 
with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/when-spacs-attack-a-new-force-is-invading-wall-street-11611378007. 
98 See Celebrities Involvement with SPACS—Investor Alert, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-
and-bulletins/celebrity-involvement-spacs-investor-alert 
[https://perma.cc/R5HW-GJ8V]. 
99 See Ramkuma & Farrell, supra note 97 (describing several such ar-
rangements). 
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allowed more ordinary investors to participate in IPOs, albeit 
in a more volatile market that has been more susceptible to 
short selling.100 
Apart from these lightly-regulated ways to go public, the 
dramatic changes in availability of private capital have made 
it possible for startup companies to fund their capital needs 
for a much longer time without going to the public markets.101 
The growth of private equity and venture capital have made 
the public markets optional for many growth companies. Such 
deep pools of finance were unavailable for most of the twenti-
eth century. Regulatory changes have also facilitated the 
trend of staying private longer or even indefinitely. The JOBS 
Act raised the threshold for the number of shareholders that 
a company can have before triggering public company status, 
which carries with it the disclosure and governance require-
ments of the Exchange Act.102 
None of these market innovations affecting the regulatory 
footprint of securities laws have yet to find their way to the 
Supreme Court. The greater reliance on private finance and 
markets has left a greater share of securities transactions out-
side the space from which the Supreme Court has tradition-
ally drawn its securities docket. 
One of the most prominent examples in the innovative 
space known as FinTech has been bitcoin and other cryptocur-
rencies. In the initial period of bitcoin use, it regularly 
 
100 See Matt Wirz & Juliet Chung, Short Sellers Boost Bets Against 
SPACs, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2021, 5:30 AM) (on file with the Columbia 
Business Law Review), https://www.wsj.com/articles/short-sellers-boost-
bets-against-spacs-11615714200. 
101 See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the 
Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1573, 1604–24 (2013) (tracing changes in the regulatory environ-
ment and noting that startup companies have “[a]n alternative . . . to bypass 
[the securities] regulatory systems by staying indefinitely in the private, ac-
credited-only markets” and that such an alternative is a “threat to public 
markets like NASDAQ and NYSE”). 
102 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), Pub. L. No. 112-
106, sec. 501, § 12(g)(1)(A), 126 Stat. 306, 326 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78l(g)(1)(A) (2019)). 
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generated the question whether the bitcoin itself was a secu-
rity.103 The definition of a security is a question that has come 
before the Court more often than any other issue since 
1933.104 The SEC initially took a cautious approach with cryp-
tocurrency, suggesting it could be a security, but not launch-
ing widespread enforcement.105 More recently, cryptocurrency 
issues have moved away from the definition of a security. In-
stead, the debate around digital currencies addresses broader 
questions of payment systems and foreign exchange. Central 
bank digital currencies and Digital Dollars pose complex ques-
tions regarding public and private developments of crypto 
money as innovative digital forms of currency.106 The move 
toward a cashless society has accelerated in recent years. 
These developments could remake the business of companies 
focused on payment systems. International issues likely will 
be recurring questions given the potential to transform for-
eign exchange transactions and the potential effects on the 
money supply affecting both domestic economies and interna-
tional economics. These questions could come to the Supreme 
Court, but it is unlikely they will put securities law at center 
stage. 
 
103 See, e.g., generally, Jeffrey E. Alberts & Bertrand Fry, Is Bitcoin a 
Security?, 21 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 1 (2015). 
104 See, e.g., generally, SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); 
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985); Reves v. Ernst & 
Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990); SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004). 
105 See Kevin Helms, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton Explains US Crypto 
Regulation, Calls Bitcoin a Store of Value, BITCOIN: NEWS (Nov. 23, 2020), 
https://news.bitcoin.com/us-cryptocurrency-regulation-sec-chairman-jay-
clayton-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/2UUX-ZG2J] (reporting SEC Chairman 
Jay Clayton’s statement that “we are going to see more regulation around 
the payment space” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
106 See, e.g., generally John Crawford, Lev Menand & Morgan Ricks, 
FedAccounts: Digital Dollars, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113 (2021); Paul Wong 
& Jesse Leigh Maniff, Comparing Means of Payment: What Role for a Cen-
tral Bank Digital Currency?, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., 
https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.2739 [https://perma.cc/5HD5-MQF2] 
(last updated Apr. 12, 2021). 
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2. Chevron Questions 
One area that could take the Court’s work in securities law 
back to its origins is the Chevron doctrine. The doctrine takes 
its name from the Court’s unanimous 1984 decision upholding 
an Environmental Protection Agency regulation interpreting 
multiple pollution devices as a single statutory source under 
the Clean Air Act,107 but it has become the central focus of 
administrative law more generally. The case arose under en-
vironmental statutes, but the underlying issue hearkens back 
to the Court’s earliest interactions with the securities laws. In 
particular, the Court’s 1940s securities decisions frequently 
sounded more in administrative law generally, rather than 
the specifics of securities law. The central question in many of 
the Court’s decisions that decade—most prominently in 
Chenery I and II—turned on how to interpret statutory si-
lence. How much deference would the Court afford the SEC in 
filling in gaps in legislation? (The answer then was quite a 
lot).108 The Court held in Chevron, generally consistent with 
the views of the Court in Chenery II, that where Congress has 
not directly spoken on the precise question at issue, the 
agency determination is entitled to deference if it is a “reason-
able accommodation of . . . competing interests.”109 
The Court’s Chevron holding found a booster in Justice An-
tonin Scalia, even though he did not join the Court until two 
years after the decision. Soon after coming to the Court, Scalia 
devoted a law school lecture to Chevron’s defense.110 More re-
cent conservative Justices have been more skeptical, most no-
tably Justice Clarence Thomas, who has specifically urged the 
Court to reexamine the doctrine.111 Justices Samuel Alito, 
 
107 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
866 (1984). 
108 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943); SEC v. 
Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 201–-03 (1947). 
109 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
110 See generally Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511. 
111 See Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 761–64 (2015) (Thomas, J., con-
curring). 
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Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh have expressed skepti-
cism, if not hostility, toward the doctrine.112 The challenge has 
been described as a desire to turn away from a system of bu-
reaucratic rule that “has its root[s] in . . . the Progressive 
Era.”113 Those “roots” got room to grow from the New Deal 
Justices who played such an important role in enacting and 
defending the fledgling securities laws in the 1930s. Skepti-
cism of Chevron strikes at the heart of the Progressive faith 
in expert decisionmaking that drove the creation of the SEC. 
The issue of deference to administrative agencies might 
well come to the fore during a time in which the presidency 
and the agencies are in the hands of one party, but legislative 
initiatives remain difficult with Congress closely divided. The 
current political environment, with a clear majority of the 
Court having been appointed by Republican Presidents and a 
Democrat in the White House working with thin majorities in 
both houses of Congress, may set the stage for a sequel to the 
confrontations of the 1930s. If such a disagreement arose in 
the field of securities law, a likely setting might be SEC rule-
making relating to climate change disclosure or political con-
tributions by public companies, current lightning rods on the 
SEC’s potential regulatory agenda. 
 
 
112 See Jonathan H. Adler, Shunting Aside Chevron Deference, THE 
REGUL. REV. (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/08/07/adler-
shunting-aside-chevron-deference/ [https://perma.cc/99BB-BT6N]; Kent 
Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, Judge Kavanaugh, 
Chevron Deference, and the Supreme Court, THE REGUL. REV. (Sept. 3, 2018), 
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/09/03/barnett-boyd-walker-kavanaugh-
chevron-deference-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/RW96-Q3WE] (re-
counting Justice Kavanaugh’s doubts about Chevron); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. 
Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152–58 (2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
113 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 129 n.6 (2015) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the judgment); see also Examining the Federal Regulatory 
System to Improve Accountability, Transparency and Integrity: Hearing Be-
fore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3 (2015) (statement of 
Charles J. Cooper, Founding Partner and Chairman, Cooper & Kirk, PLLC) 
(“This vision of expansive bureaucratic power took hold in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence in the early twentieth century, particularly during 
the New Deal.”). 
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3. Federal Corporate Law as a Possible Twenty-
First Century Setting 
Corporate governance rules have long been the province of 
state law. Dissatisfaction with the perceived management 
bias in such rules has generated recurring efforts to displace 
the state system with federal incorporation. The initial push 
for federal incorporation during the Progressive period at the 
turn of the twentieth century garnered the most attention, 
with three consecutive Presidents—Theodore Roosevelt, Wil-
liam Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson—supporting the 
move but no bill ever clearing Congress.114 During the New 
Deal, key players such as Adolf Berle and William O. Douglas 
supported federal incorporation,115 but they never persuaded 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who had other political priorities. 
Instead, the federal securities legislation of the 1930s—with 
the notable exceptions of PUHCA and the Chandler Act—fo-
cused on disclosure to help make effective the corporate gov-
ernance rights conferred by state law on shareholders. Wil-
liam Cary, who personified the reinvigoration of securities 
regulation as Chair of the SEC during the 1960s, triggered a 
boomlet for federal corporate law with his insider trading de-
cision for the SEC in 1961 in Cady Roberts.116 After his return 
to Columbia Law, Cary wrote an important law review article 
in the 1970s calling for federal minimum standards for corpo-
rations.117 No broad legislation followed, however, as 
 
114 See generally Camden Hutchinson, Progressive Era Conceptions of 
the Corporation and the Failure of the Federal Chartering Movement, 2017 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1017 (discussing the Progressive Era history of federal 
incorporation, the presidential support for it, and its loss of momentum dur-
ing the Wilson administration). 
115 Letter from William O. Douglas, Professor, Yale L. Sch., to A.A. 
Berle, Jr., Professor, Columbia L. Sch. (Jan. 3, 1934) (on file with the Wil-
liam O. Douglas Collection, Library of Congress) (“You can count on me to 
pull an oar on federal incorporation . . . . [P]erhaps we can begin to get at 
the really fundamental problem of the increment of power and profit inher-
ent in our present forms of organization[.]”). 
116 See generally Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
117  William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law, Reflections upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974). 
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Congress was distracted by more salient political questions in 
the post-Watergate era. The only legislation was the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977118 targeting foreign bribery by 
U.S. companies, which fit awkwardly in the pattern of the fed-
eral securities laws. 
Instead, one-off pieces of legislation provided repeated, if 
never comprehensive, federal requirements for public corpo-
rations. For example, the two most significant securities stat-
utes of the twenty-first century, Sarbanes–Oxley in 2002119 
and Dodd–Frank in 2010,120 for the first time provided federal 
rules as to the required composition of boards of directors, re-
quiring that the audit and compensation committees be com-
prised of independent directors.121 State laws, by contrast, say 
nothing about requirements for directors. Federal law has 
also increased the items on which shareholders must vote, in-
cluding requiring their approval of executive compensation, 
albeit only in an advisory role.122 The SEC, too, continues to 
use its existing powers to create broader disclosure require-
ments and to expand shareholder rights. SEC rules have ex-
panded disclosure in multiple areas to regulate the substance 
of corporate governance indirectly through “comply or ex-
plain” disclosure requirements.123 The agency was requiring 
disclosure to put a thumb on the scale, not issuing mandates. 
 
118 Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3). 
119 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 
745, 775–77 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2019)) (directing the SEC to 
refuse to list issuers without an audit committee that is entirely independ-
ent). 
120 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. 111-203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–03 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j-3) (directing the SEC to decline to list issuers without an independent 
compensation committee). 
121 Principal executive officers must certify that they have reported to 
the independent committees. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14(b)(5) (2020). 
122 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(i), 78n-1. 
123 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(1) (2020) (“If the registrant does not 
have a standing nominating committee or committee performing similar 
functions, state the basis for the view of the board of directors that it is 
appropriate for the registrant not to have such a committee and identify 
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The D.C. Circuit—the most common court for reviews of 
regulatory challenges—has on occasion struck down SEC 
rulemaking efforts, particularly if new rules strayed beyond 
disclosure. For example, the appellate court struck down SEC 
rulemaking in 1990 that effectively banned dual class shares, 
a management entrenchment device which long had been per-
mitted by state laws.124 The court reasoned that the rule 
would establish a federal corporate law which exceeded the 
agency’s statutory authority.125 Twenty years later, another 
D.C. Circuit panel struck down an SEC rule that expanded 
shareholder powers to use the company’s proxy to nominate 
candidates for election to the board of directors.126 That chal-
lenge could have been based on federalism, as was the one to 
dual class rulemaking just discussed. During the SEC rule-
making process, however, Congress in the Dodd–Frank Act 
included a specific section authorizing the agency to adopt 
such a rule,127 so the appellate court instead rejected the rule 
as arbitrary and capricious for failing the cost-benefit require-
ments for SEC rulemaking imposed by the Exchange Act.128 
Neither of these decisions were reviewed by the Supreme 
Court. But if a securities case were to be the basis for a Chev-
ron decision, it likely would be one grounded in corporate gov-
ernance rulemaking or a disclosure mandate relating to cor-
porate social responsibility. Proposals for federal 
incorporation resurfaced during the Democratic presidential 
primaries in 2020 but failed to gain much traction.129 Pro-
posals relating to corporate social responsibility have become 
 
each director who participates in the consideration of director nominees.”); 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 406(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a)) (re-
quiring companies to adopt a code of ethics or explain why they have not). 
124 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
125  Id. at 412 
126 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
127 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 971(a), § 14(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(2)). 
128 Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148. 
129 See, e.g., Empowering Workers Through Accountable Capitalism, 
WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/accountable-capi-
talism [https://perma.cc/Z4AL-YBRD]. 
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a prominent part of progressives’ political agenda for public 
corporations.130 If one or more became part of the SEC’s 
agenda, a challenge in the D.C. Circuit—which retains a ma-
jority of Democratic appointees—would be likely. It is not dif-
ficult to imagine that such a challenge to agency rulemaking 
on Chevron grounds might attract the Supreme Court’s atten-
tion. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The securities context that so captured the New Deal 
Court’s embrace of agency deference—in the Chenery cases 
and others—might well provide a twenty-first century Su-
preme Court revisit of that almost century-old switch. Absent 
such a combination, securities are likely to be something of a 
backwater for some time to come, with meandering results. 
The pathbreaking role that securities law played during the 
New Deal and the Sixties and Seventies remains a remote pos-
sibility for the Supreme Court as currently configured. 
 
 
130 See, e.g., BUS. ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A COR-
PORATION 1 (2021), https://system.businessroundtable.org/app/up-
loads/sites/5/2021/02/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-
Feburary-2021-compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9CD-4NQB]. The Busi-
ness Roundtable released its statement in 2019, but it continues to collect 
signatures. Id. 
